The Chemical industry is undergoing its longest and most vicious downcycle in recent history. Margins and utilization have rarely been so low for so long, and company prices reflect this.
At the center of this downcycle is the olefins and polyolefins industry, the largest chemical segment by far, and the heart of the petrochemicals and plastics industry. Many large chemical companies have olefin and polyolefin operations, and their economics make or break downstream industries.
In this Primer series, I want to analyze this industry in order to find opportunities among the chaos, while avoiding the value traps.
The first article of this series serves as a fairly complete introduction to the industry and will serve as a tool to analyze assets and companies in future deliveries. I explain what olefins and polyolefins are, their role in modern society, where and why they are demanded, where they are produced, how their economics work, and why it is undergoing a vicious downcycle.
I also analyze the main trends shaping the cycle of the future: feedstock and competition drivers, the role of climate change and O&G majors, geopolitical uncertainties, and more.
I am certain that after reading this article, you will have a good generalist understanding of where the industry is and where it might head, and that you will have the tools to analyze names and opportunities.
Without further ado, let’s crack it!
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Understanding the basics
Olefins are the most important feedstocks into the petrochemical industry. Ethylene and propylene are the building blocks of petrochem (there are other olefins like butene, pentene, etc. with more limited applications).
Polyolefins (polyethylene and polypropylene), the direct derivatives of olefins make up 50% of all plastics globally. Olefins are also present in the production processes of all other important plastics (PS, PVC, PET, PUR).
As building blocks, olefins also mark the limit between the petrochemical industry and the refining industry. Upstream products (like ethane, propane, or naphtha) are considered part of refining. Olefins and their downstream are part of the petrochemical industry.
In this section, we will go over the basics needed to understand the olefins and polyolefins market: what they are, what they are used for, how and where they are manufactured. This section is very important to understand the dynamics of the market later, and to determine company-specific strategic-fit.
Demand sources: the middle class commodity
Olefin demand is tied to plastics consumables and grows very linearly with GDP
Olefins are basic building blocks for all plastics, but two plastics in particular dominate their demand. Polyethylene makes up 60/70% of all demand for ethylene, and polypropylene makes up the same amount of all demand for propylene.
Most polyethylene demand comes from packaging or films for consumer products (the majority of food packaging and plastic bags are made out of polyethylene), plus some piping (construction). Ethylene is also important in the chains of PET (plastic bottles, polyester fabrics) and PVC (pipes, i.e. construction).
Polypropylene is present in many hard plastics products, like a plastic chair, a bottle cap, or a plastic bucket, or as hard pieces in cars or other machinery. Propylene is also part of the chain of ABS (hard plastics), and polyurethanes (construction materials, foams).
That is, the majority of downstream demand for olefins comes from consumables and construction. Urbanization, in particular, is a huge driver of plastics consumption because of the requirements on food and product logistics, construction activity, and transportation, all of which require plastics.
Further, wealth drives plastics consumption linearly. The OECD found that plastics consumption to GDP is almost flat across different countries, at about 1 million tons per $3.5 million in PPP GDP (probably higher now as the figure comes from 2019). Depending on the source, the different plastics types are said to grow between 1.2x and 1.5x GDP, faster in developing countries, and more slowly in developed countries.
Final demand in the rich world, intermediate demand in Asia
The above also means that plastics final consumption centers are the GDP centers: North America, the European Union, developed Asia and China as big drivers, with the emerging populated markets (India, SEA, Africa, LatAm) as potential future growth drivers.
Of course, the fact that these plastics are consumed based on GDP does not mean they are produced where they are consumed, or that their original demand is there. For example, even though a chair made of polypropylene is ‘consumed’ in the US, it may have been made in China, and therefore the polypropylene was ‘consumed’ there. From this perspective, China alone makes up 1/3 of polypropylene intermediate demand and 1/3 to 1/2 of polyethylene intermediate demand, with no European country in the top 10, and the US at only about 10% and 5% of each plastic. Plastic intermediate demand centers skew significantly more Asian along with industrial production.
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Supply side
Chemistry basics
Chemistry and the upstream petrochemical industry play a relevant role in olefin economics and supply. We need a basic knowledge of feedstocks, logistics, and the chemistry of it all.
Olefins and polyolefins are petrochem derivatives. The chain starts with feedstocks (ethane, propane, naphtha), which are basic chains of carbon and hydrogen. These feedstocks are produced in conjunction with oil and natural gas extraction and refining, as co-products.
These feedstocks are then cracked in an olefin cracker. They are mixed with steam and heat at super high speeds. This process breaks the molecules, leaving carbon atoms with less hydrogens than needed for stabilization. The carbon atoms join again, but this time with a double (weaker) bond (see image below). The stream is quickly cooled down (quenching) and separated in distillation towers (the classical elongated and consecutive towers of a refining or olefins plant). The results are olefins (ethylene, propylene, butenes).
The second (weak) bond is what makes olefins so versatile and important as building blocks. When this bond is broken, the carbon atoms need to join something else to stabilize, and therefore chemists can form new molecules.
For example, by “simply” (in super complex chemical terms) breaking the bond between the two carbons, one can create chains of what seems like ethane (simple bond) molecules, in polyethylene. By adding oxygen, ethylene can turn into ethylene oxide which then becomes part of the PET chain. By adding chlorine, ethylene can become dichloroethane, which eventually leads to PVC. The same can be said of propylene, leading to polypropylene, propylene oxide (important for polyurethanes), acrylonitrile (mixed with ammonia, and important for ABS plastics), and so on.
The role of feedstocks
On the supply side, the availability of feedstocks plays a key role in competitiveness and geographical location. Depending where feedstocks are cheaper, olefins and polyolefins will also be cheaper. The location of oil and gas extraction and refining capabilities determines this feedstock availability. In this respect, olefins are a classical commodity with resource-generated rents and cost-curve advantages.
In order to understand these feedstock drivers, we need some petrochemistry knowledge. We can get to olefins from oil, gas, coal, or even bio-products like ethanol. In this article we will concentrate on oil and gas, the main sources.
Feedstocks are co-products of fuels and natural gas production
First, it’s important to understand that what we get from the ground, either on a gas or oil well, is never a single pure product. Rather, it is a mix of many hydrocarbons, mainly alkanes and cycloalkanes. These are basically chains of carbons, plus hydrogen. The names refer to the number of carbon atoms in the molecule (methane = 1 carbon; ethane = 2 carbons; propane = 3 carbons, and so on).
Therefore, from the well, these streams generally go through at least two stages of refining. First separating gases from liquids, like oil and water. Gases are then further separated, generally close to the production area, into different gas streams (mainly methane, then ethane and also some propane). Methane is what we generally call natural gas per se, used in heating, energy generation, ammonia, etc. Ethane and propane are important olefin feedstocks, but can also be used for heating or electricity generation.
Something similar happens with oil, which is refined into fuels, lubricants, naphtha, propane, butane, and others. We care about naphtha here, which is not a chemical component but rather a mix of them (from five to twelve carbon atoms), because naphtha is another important olefin feedstock.
The feedstocks used to produce olefins (ethane, propane, butane, naphtha) are co-products of more important products (natural gas, fuels). They are, one could say, somewhat of a surplus product that you get in addition to the other products. In fact, it is not strange for naphtha to have negative margins or for ethane to be sold as regular natural gas. Feedstocks are in oversupply in regions with large O&G extraction or large oil refining capacity.
Logistics difficulty against the law of one price and opportunity costs
There is a second factor affecting feedstock availability, and that is logistics. Some feedstocks are easy to transport while others are not, and therefore are more conveniently used on-site.
Ethane and ethylene are gases at ambient temperature that can only be transported via pipeline, or cryogenized in special vessels, at great cost. Propane and butane are also gases but can be liquefied at ambient temperature via pressure, without cryogenics (this is why they are called Liquefied Petroleum Gases or LPGs). Finally, oil and naphtha are the easiest to transport and store, because they are liquids at ambient temperature.
The logistics difficulties of the feedstocks (or lack therefore, like oil or naphthas) affect their opportunity cost and therefore the value they command on the market.
If not used for petrochems, ethane has to be burned as regular natural gas, and therefore its alternative value is tied to natural gas prices. Because the transport of gas is limited, the potential demand for ethane is more regionalized (unless there’s export capacity like LNG terminals). Propane and butane can be transported and used as an independent source of energy or heat with more ease. Naphtha is a liquid that can be converted or added to gasoline, and therefore has a global market as a fuel, with its price determined by oil.
Because of the difficult transport and storage, ethane, and ethylene tend to have very different prices in different regions. In contrast, easier to transport feedstocks (propane, and naphtha) will have a more homogeneous global price. This difference in price then leads to different cost structures and competitiveness. Ethane is generally cheaper as a feedstock because of its lower alternative value, difficulty of storage, and smaller logistically-addressable market, compared to propane, and even more compared to naphtha.
In addition, the difficulty for transport generates a tendency for olefin and polyolefin complexes to integrate geographically. Olefin and polyolefin complexes are very close to refineries or gas separation plants. This is true both for O&G producer regions as well as for importer regions.
Feedstock conversion yields
Finally, not all feedstocks yield the same ratios of olefins, increasing or decreasing the role of feedstock availability in costs. Ethane yields almost entirely ethylene, with very little in terms of propylene and other olefins. Propane and naphtha generate more balanced yields between ethylene, propylene and others.
The above implies that excess ethane capacity is a much more important driver of competitiveness in ethylene and ethylene derivatives (Polyethylene, PET, PVC). For propylene and derivatives the playing field is much more balanced.
Adding all up: global cost curves
Based on the natural factors above, it is not hard to find which areas are advantaged to produce olefins, in particular ethylene: close to oil basins, close to gas basins, and close to refineries, approximately in that order.
Oil producing regions are advantaged because oil generally includes gases, but most oil producing regions do not have large industrial bases or the infrastructure to move that gas somewhere else. Therefore, the associated gases (like ethane, propane) can be very cheap. This is the case of Middle Eastern production (in particular, Saudi Arabia), which sits at the bottom of all the curves. It is also the case of the US because of the Permian basin. These regions can also have significant refinery capacity, and therefore excess supply of naphtha as well.
A region more focused on gas, like some basins in the US or Qatar, are less competitive, but still advantaged. Natural gas production generates fewer excess feedstocks (most dry gas is 90% methane, compared with 75% for oil-associated gas), and generally these regions may have infrastructure to export natural gas as fuel (like LNG terminals), therefore competing with petrochems for ethane.
Finally, we have the areas that refine a lot of oil but don’t produce it. These are historically industrial areas that don’t have access to their sufficient feedstocks of their own, like Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and increasingly India), and Europe (specially Netherlands, Belgium). These areas generally sit at the top of the curve, with naphtha-based crackers.
Therefore, for ethylene (where ethane surpluses play a huge role), the Middle East and North America dominate the curve, at potentially 1/2 to 1/3 of the cost of naphtha-based producers in North East Asia and the EU. This translates downstream to polyethylene and to the rest of the ethylene chain.
For propylene, the cost advantage of ME and US still exists, but is much lower, as naphtha or propane are the main feedstocks, and they can be transported more easily (therefore making the global price more homogeneous). Chinese and European naphtha-crackers can compete more profitably in this market, albeit depending on factors like energy-prices, or age of the facilities.
Note: You can observe the differences in feedstock, olefin and polyolefin prices for different regions in BusinessAnalytIQ, the only service I found with free, long-term, regional data (polypropylene, polyethylene, ethylene, propylene).
World trade dynamics
The combination of the above generates a very interesting world-trade dynamic for olefins and polyolefins. These trade dynamics will be important when we think of the implications of protectionism in a world with significant overcapacity.
On the one hand, production of olefins is concentrated on very few markets, some with high hydrocarbon production (US, ME) while others have significant refinery capacity (EU, China, Asia). Production of polyolefins follows approximately the distribution of olefins, given the advantages of integration mentioned above.
Then some of those regions become net exporters of polyolefins, like the US and Middle East mainly, plus Asia in some part. That is an export of the untreated virgin plastic pellets. And then again, those plastics are transformed (show as cons(use) in the table below), and re-exported again, to yet another market (shown as cons(direct) below). In this way, China is a net importer of virgin polyolefins, but a net exporter of polyolefin-transformed products. The US is kind of the opposite, net exporter of virgin polyolefins and a net importer of polyolefin-transformed products. Europe and Asia are similar to the US, and the Middle East is the only true full net export location.
The olefins cycle
The mother of all cyclical industries
In my Cyclical Industries Framework I wrote that ‘the most important characteristic for creating a cyclical industry is probably the existence of impediments to supply adjustment, to the upside or the downside. The more complex and lengthy the process for increasing or reducing supply, the longer the cycle period and the larger the cycle amplitude.’
This could not be more true when talking about olefins, because the industry ticks all of the boxes that make supply and demand adjustments very complex.
Building an olefin or polyolefin plant requires years and a few billion in CAPEX. This implies that investment decisions have to be taken years in advance projecting how demand and the rest of supply will behave. Further, although a plant construction can be slowed down or delayed, it is usually uneconomical to stop a project once construction has started.
Olefin plants have large fixed costs that cannot be adapted easily. These obviously include depreciation as an accrual, but also maintenance, and labor. Fixed costs need to be diluted, and lead to producers prioritizing volumes over margins.
Finally on the supply side, olefin plants operate stream uninterrupted processes that cannot be stopped, and where volumes are hard to vary. An olefin plant cannot run some days at 50% capacity and the next one at 85%. This also creates a bias towards oversupply.
Then, on the demand side, demand is very price inelastic, because plastics are an irreplaceable part of human existence. If the price of ethylene goes up, no one is going to stop buying Coca-Cola bottles made out of PET, or a package of pasta made out of polyethylene. In most cases, the cost of packaging is negligible from the perspective of the consumer. On the other hand, if the price of ethylene goes down, no one will buy any additional plastic bottles just because of that. Inflexible demand is another driver of markets clearing via price and not volumes (and therefore generating cycles).
On demand, you do have a short-inventory cycle, which is driven by downstream plastics-product manufacturers accumulating or destocking based on cycles in their own industry. This can drive some bullwhip effects on demand but is nothing compared to the overall cycle.
The cycle today
The signs of capacity underutilization were already evident before the pandemic, especially as the US added a lot of capacity riding on the shale revolution, to serve the Chinese market.
For some time, during the pandemic, the trend reverted a little because of challenges in all supply chains. However, already in 2020 China started to add capacity above the global increment in demand, while the US was adding too. To this, we have to add the collapse of construction activity in China, reducing a big driver of consumption of plastics, plus in general slowing down the Chinese economy.
The result is that capacity additions have outstripped demand for 6 years already, with small interregnums in 2024 (fewer additions) and 2021 (bounce demand from COVID). This is true for all markets: ethylene, propylene, polyethylene, and polypropylene.
The current olefin and polyolefin cycle is already more violent than any previous one, in terms of length and capacity utilization levels. Some analysts believe the industry is at 40% of pre-COVID margins.
Most importantly, the different consulting companies in the market all point towards even more additions, majoritarily coming from China (50% to 80% of the additions, depending on the market). The numbers differ, but the agreement is that the market will become even more oversupplied.
The cycle in the future
Standing from where we are today, the question is what will happen to the cycle in the future: how low can margins get, how long will it take for a recovery to take place, and how will different geographies and asset bases perform during the downturn and after the recovery.
We have already reviewed the basics to understand where demand comes from, where it is expected to grow, where supply is located and where it is expected to expand.
If this was a simple market, the data above would be enough to understand the future. The simplest scenario would be a classical global cyclical readjustment: margins are pushed down by entrant supply until the higher-cost older supply leaves the market. Yearly surplus capacity additions decrease because of low margins in the industry, and eventually the balance between supply and demand recovers.
However, the olefins market of today is traversed by many uncertain strategic factors that can make the outcomes differ substantially from what classic industrial economics theory would predict. In this section we will cover some of these factors, in order to create a more nuanced view of the range of outcomes.
Winners and losers in a regular cycle
Assuming that market forces work (a big if, as we will see below), then the down cycle will lead to a new balance of supply and demand. This can only come from the supply side, given that demand, as we saw, is basically inelastic and does not expand because of lower prices.
Supply-side adjustments can come in two forms: supply removal via cash costs, or lower supply growth via capital costs.
In the first case, the producers at the top of the cost curve will eventually decide to shut operations, basically because they are not able to cover the operational (cash) costs of the business. In that case, it becomes uneconomical to continue running the operation. These producers are mostly located in North East Asia (Japan, Korea, China), Europe, and Latin America. In the case of ethylene, lower-cost producers have a feedstock advantage (the Middle East and the US). In the case of propylene, it is the largest integrated players that drive the curve, with the weight of refining more important than feedstock.
We are already seeing some of these dynamics. Most integrated chemical majors have announced shutdowns or divestments in Europe (Exxon, Dow, SABIC, LyondellBasell, with the interesting exception of INEOS). Some believe that as much as 15% of European polyethylene capacity. In many public statements, CEOs have commented that as much as 25% of Asian capacity is operating below cash costs in the ethylene chain.
Still, even reducing capacity takes time. In a recent call, Dow commented that the capacity shutdowns announced in Europe in 1H25 will carry until FY27.
In the second case, even large profitable producers decide to halt expansion and mothball projects. This happens because the margins are expected to be so low that the project's discounted value cannot cover its costs. These are large, $3/6 billion projects that require good margins to recover the investment.
Again, this is also happening, at least in part, in the US and the Middle East, where very few capacity additions are planned for the next few years. This is not the case in China, at least until 2028/29.
Finally, the longer the second type (addition halts) takes, the higher the chance that the first type (capacity cuts) takes place, because new capacity pushes cash margins even lower.
The role of O&G majors
Unfortunately, we are not dealing with a regular cycle at all. There are strategic forces pushing for overcapacity that will probably influence how decisions are made, not entirely on industry-restricted economic grounds. The first such factor is the increasing role that O&G majors are playing in the olefins industry.
One of the big drivers of the overinvestment in olefins, globally, has been the fear that fuel consumption will reach a peak within the next decade (Exxon says peak of light-vehicle fuel in 2025, and all-type liquid fuel consumption to increase only 10% by 2050; Sinopec announced that China’s fuel consumption fell in 2024 already). This is expected to happen earlier for oil-derived fuels, because of electrification, but eventually even for natural gas, because of its replacement by renewable sources in the energy grid.
This leaves a lot of assets in the O&G and especially in the refinery industry stranded. The response strategy followed by many O&G majors has been to increase their olefin and polyolefin capacities, to provide some diversification, and potentially shield part of their revenues from O&G. Importantly, there is no projection for peak plastics any time soon.
There is also a lot of hope around Crude Oil to Chemicals (COTC) technologies applied to refineries to increase the level of derivatives that can be used to produce petrochemicals. So far, there is no working large refinery that has meaningfully changed the yields of different types of oil, but this trend will continue.
In my opinion, I do not really understand why it makes sense for an O&G major to own petrochemical assets. Say, for example, that a company has reserves with an extraction cost of $X. If, because of oil demand falling, the price of oil falls to $Y, below $X, then it is uneconomical for the major to produce that oil instead of buying from the market, even with petrochemical assets. And if the price $Y is above $X, then it is economical to produce, even without petrochemical assets.
Still, when we look at the largest companies investing even today in the segment they are mostly oil majors: Exxon, Saudi Aramco (via SABIC), PetroChina, Sinopec. In fact, the largest Chinese projects coming in the next few years are JVs between Chinese NOCs and SABIC, Exxon, or Shell.
In addition, the CAPEX required to open large petrochem operations is negligible for these companies. In most cases, the CAPEX dedicated to chemicals, even when opening large operations, is 10% or 15% of the CAPEX dedicated to O&G extraction and refining.
The above means that oil majors might support less profitable olefin operations because they help increase the use life/return of other O&G and refinery assets. That means more capacity for longer, and lower margins for longer.
Protectionism and trade alliances
As we saw above, the market for polyolefins (and in a smaller way olefins because of harder transport) is heavily globalized. The trade dynamics are complex and interlocked. A product might travel from one country to another for intermediate use and then back to the origin for consumption.
For example, China is building more ethane-based crackers, but does not produce much ethane. Ethane is imported from the US and the Middle East. In turn, the polyethylene derived from that ethane pressure on US polyethylene margins. Or conversely, the US exports polyethylene to China, but then re-imports a large part of that in the form of products, packaging, etc.
If operating rates continue to fall, competition for foreign markets will increase. For example, the US and the Middle East are net exporters, much of which goes to China, a country that might prefer to purchase its own product. This increases pressure on other markets, like Asia, Europe, or Latin America.
I would not be surprised by tariff, dumping, and trade alliance wars in petrochemicals. This is particularly true for self-reliant or net importer regions with little exports (Europe, India, LatAm, and North East Asia). US allies like Japan and South Korea might grant favorable treatment to US chemicals, or smaller but relevant countries like Brazil, Turkey, or India might close part of their petrochemical markets. It is unlikely that they will simply allow their industries to be sacrificed.
In the event of tariffs, the most benefited are companies with assets concentrated in low competitiveness areas (say INEOS in the EU). For companies with export-oriented assets (US, Middle East), the situation is not that bad, because it’s unlikely that tariffs result in market share losses. A tariff is an internal tax to consumers, in order to equal internal prices with external prices, but it does not affect global prices. That is, if a US company were selling polyethylene at prices X to Europe, and Europe enacts protectionist measures, then the sale price to Europe remains X, but the internal price in Europe climbs to X + tariff. Of course, insofar as tariff helps avoid supply restructuring, they lengthen the global cycle.
A related trend, especially relevant for Europe, is carbon pricing and recycled content used as a protectionism mechanism. European producers are losing competitiveness because they have to pay for carbon credits and for expensive low-carbon energy sources. The EU is expected to implement carbon pricing at the border, so that producers compete on fairer grounds. Similar dynamics are expected for recycled plastic content requirements.
China's self-sufficiency and involution
China compounds the uncertainty factors above because of its strategic position as the largest net import market, and also the largest capacity-adder in the next few years.
It is also the most advanced on fuel phase-outs; it is advancing rapidly into the electrification of transport, meaning it needs to shift refinery demand to chemicals more quickly. It also has large coal mining and processing capacities that could find a market in chemicals (although coal to chemicals remains one of the most expensive technologies).
If China wants to play by the rules of global trade and economics, it should allow foreign competition to displace part of its less efficient, smaller capacity. However, it could also subsidize or protect domestic less efficient capacity, pushing even further into lower margins for global producers, both because of China's domestic-market pressure, as well as because of export-market pressure.
So far, the comments around fighting involution seem to point towards allowing the rationalization of capacity inside of the country, while still pushing for self-sufficiency.
Feedstock benefit changes
We saw above the importance of feedstock availability in competitiveness. Further, we saw that feedstock prices are very influenced by alternative uses (as fuel, heat or energy source). Although today the US and the Middle East have the lowest-cost feedstocks, some trends could change the degree of the benefit.
The most important, in my opinion, is the relation between natural gas and oil prices (called the oil-to-gas spread in a given region). Naphtha prices are based on oil, and ethane prices are based on natural gas. Therefore, a change in their relative prices can affect the competitiveness of naphtha or ethane-fed assets.
In this respect, the main potential change would be a decrease in oil prices in combination with an increase in natural gas prices. This could happen, for example, if fuel demand is expected to fall more quickly, whereas natural gas or LNG consumption is expected to remain high.
For example, LNG export capacity is expected to double in the US by 2028, mostly going to Europe (to cover for Russian imports). With more LNG capacity, the price of natural gas in the US should increase (because its alternative or opportunity cost increases). Although ethane cannot be transported in LNG vessels (there are special ethane cryo vessels), it can be burned in energy generation turbines. Therefore, LNG export capacity increases the price of ethane as an energy source, putting pressure on US ethylene and polyethylene competitiveness.
As shown in the value chain chart, there are more feedstocks (ethane, propane, naphtha) in wet gas from oil extraction than in dry natural gas extraction. If fuel demand falls, oil production will also fall, leading to a lower supply of ethane and propane in cost-advantageous regions, also pushing for higher ethane costs vis-à-vis naphtha.
The Russian war is another potential cost changer. If Europe could import Russian gas (including ethane), then its petrochemical industry would not be so expensive, and its transformation industry would demand higher volumes. If China or India did not receive cheaper, sanctioned Russian or Iranian oil, their feedstock prices would probably go up.
Conclusions, for now
There seems to be an opportunity at hand, maybe with some timing difficulties. Still, the thesis is not simply ‘wait for a return to the mean’. More is needed because of the strategic uncertainties at hand. The best names will probably be found among a mix of low valuations and companies with the best diversification across these strategic uncertainties.
This is a work in progress, with more detail and nuance added with every call and report read. In future deliveries, I hope to provide more data on geographies and companies. Maybe even some analysis of other olefin-based chains like oxides, polyurethanes, PVC, and PET.
To be continued…