After every quarter, I provide a review of the performance and positions of my two personal accounts (IBKR and Argentina). I think this provides readers with more context and transparency about the way I think and act as an investor myself. Most of the names on which I have positions have been covered in the blog. This article reviews 3Q25.
The article is organized by account, posting the historical returns, 3Q25 returns, sources of the quarterly returns, the changes in positions during the quarter, and finally the ending positioning.
Before beginning, I wanted to thank all of Quipus Capital's readers for your support, especially those who have upgraded. The blog has surpassed 1,500 readers. Writing and researching for Quipus is a great pleasure.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in the Blog are for general informational purposes only and are not intended to provide specific advice or recommendations for any individual or on any specific security or investment product.
Previous reports
IBKR account Q3
Q3: 13.5%; YTD: 13.3%; 1Y: 3.6%; Since inception (Jan22): 135.8% (CAGR 23%)
Historical returns - back to All Time Highs
The first image below shows the performance of the account by month and quarter (“U91..” column) compared to three benchmarks (SPXTR, EFA, and VT). The second image shows the same comparison in chart form, ending in Q2. After almost a year of drawdown, from September 2024 (-7.8% in 4Q24 and probably as much as 15% intra-quarter during the April tariff meltdown) it is good to be back to all time highs.
Return sources for the quarter and changes in positions
The quarter had a lot of new positions and I started adding to new ‘strategies’ (more shorting, selling covered calls, companies in tech, China, and Japan). In addition, several positions that had not been performing in 1H25 started to do much better. These include the short in Argentina (GGAL), the Mexican chemicals (ORBIA and ALPEKA), and apparel retail (PLCE, PVH, GIII).
When describing positions, Increase means adding to a position I already held, Initiate means initiating a new position, and Close means finishing a position I already held.
Close Argentina short (GGAL)
I initiated a short on GGAL, as a proxy for the Argentinian market, in November 2024 (see the 4Q24 portfolio report). My idea was simply that Argentina had initiated another cycle of unsustainable FX overvaluation that had affected its assets (particularly evident in banking), and that the cycle would reverse as fear around the legislative elections started to pressure on the FX. My whole thesis on the country, which played out to the minute detail, was explained in an article from April 2024.
That indeed happened, albeit with ups and downs. The short had started ‘small’ in November 2024 at about $56 (somewhere above 5% of the equity value of the account), and I increased to about 15% naively in April 2025 after the Trump tariff market collapse at about $47, just to get slaughtered by the announcement of the IMF loan to Argentina, which sent stock soaring (the whole episode is explained in the 1Q25 and 2Q25 reports). After the rally, I closed, because I was on vacations and didn’t want to ruin them by worrying incessantly on the (ex-post) stupidity of the market. However, by late 2Q25 the situation had not improved, and imbalances started to build again, so I reopened the position, at the same size, in about the same prices. The average weight of the position across the whole period (November 2024 to October 2025) was 10/12% of the equity, and the average shorting price about $48.6 (calculated manually and prone to errors as I can’t find a way for IBKR to do the calc for me). I closed the position the week before the legislative elections at $37.95, so that the stock short generated a return of 22%, most of it in Q2.
In addition to this, after closing the stock trade, I bought OTM calls ($30 strike versus underlying price then of about $38) expiring two weeks after the election, for about 0.5% of the portfolio. I was not expecting to make money out of these, but when the elections led to a stock collapse, I ended up selling them for a 365% return, and opening a new position (also about 0.5%) with a strike at $28, for the same expiry which generated a 145% return. If I had held with the original options to expiry, I would have made a close to 1,700% return on the position.
The lesson, shorting is hard, even with the correct thesis, and a fair amount of luck.
Initiate VIST: I have actually flipped long Argentina, by starting to buy VIST, both before and after the elections. This incredible oil and gas operator is hit by both lower oil prices and the Argentinian bear market, but its situation is fairly disconnected from the Argentinian woes in operational terms (of course not in sentiment/momentum). VIST is now 2.7% of the portfolio.
Strategy: sell short-dated covered OTM calls
I started to experiment this quarter with selling short-dated covered OTM calls on positions I expect to hold for a long-term, but that would not mind selling for a profit. These options usually expire withing 2/3 weeks, and have strikes at prices 30/40% above underlying. I made a small profit of about 35bps on this, writing on positions that occupy about 4% of my portfolio (PLCE and ERII). I will look forward to continue doing this in small steps in the future.
Initiate long-dated OTM puts on SPY
I bought SPY puts expiring in January 2028, with a strike of $320 (versus current price of $669) for a little below 1.5% of equity. The reason for this is to experiment with tail-hedging, a topic on which I am a complete neofit. More pressingly though, I am concerned with the mix of global conflict, a booming stock market, a cooling economy, and the FED lowering rates.
Shorts: Initiate (CX, TCX, REKR, RCKY, LE), Close (ACQ), Maintain (DBI)
I started doing small shorts (each between 0.5% and 1% of the equity) in 2Q25. The reasons are worries about the market, that I want to experiment with shorting, and that I have a long position in a few junky stocks (mainly PLCE) that are correlated.
This quarter, I closed the ACQ short at a loss after the position doubled. I maintain the thesis on the name (super leveraged and exposed to the exploding auto market) but I want to maintain the exits that I set on these positions.
In junky retail apparel and footwear, more correlated with PLCE, I maintained DBI (currently down on the position), and added LE and RCKY.
I also added two companies that are very levered and unprofitable, and operate in ‘tech’, REKR and TCX.
Finally, I shorted CX (about 1% of equity, being a larger name) on the read that cement margins are at peak historical levels, with early indications of a decreasing trend.
Maintain PLCE: Did not move this position even after the rally of the past month. I wrote about PLCE in my original portfolio report from 3Q24.
Close PVH, GII: After holding them for more than a year, going through several ups and downs, including the tariff scare, I closed PVH and GIII, I believe for breakeven. The situation has deteriorated post-tariffs, just like for any apparel manufacturer or producer, but these names are trading at prices similar to where they were last year or before tariffs, without improvements in execution. In general, I also want less exposure to the American consumer.
Initiate small-cap deep-value Chinese chemicals
Earlier in the quarter, I wrote about 3 Cheap Chinese Chemicals, companies growing, with profitable margins, interesting dividend yields, and a good part of their market cap in cash.
Each of the positions is about 1.5%/2% of the portfolio.
Lee & Man Chemical ($0746.HK): Integrated player in chlorine, fluoropolymers, and fluorochemicals. 10 year revenue CAGR 6/10% depending on cycle position. NTM dividend yield 7.5%. TTM P/E around 7x, but price to 2018-2025 average earnings is 4x. Current EBIT margin in down-cycle is 15%, previous average 25%.
China Sunsine Chemical ($QES.SGX): Leader (20/30% market share) of global rubber chemicals (automotive industry downstream), growing at 10%+ CAGR since early 2000s, mid-teens EBIT margins, dividend+repurchase yield of 4/6%, net cash is 70% of market cap (no plans to distribute, mostly in Mainland).
Infinity Development Holdings - ($0640.HK): Supplier of adhesives to footwear industry, probably 10% market share global, mid-teens EBIT margins, and growing at 5% CAGR for 20+ years. Trades at 5x P/E, dividend yield 10%, and 60% of market cap is net cash (no plans to distribute though).
Initiate small-cap deep-value Japanese chemicals
In a very similar vein, I wrote about several Japanese chemicals with deep-value (and sometimes quality) characteristics. Each one of these positions is about 1% of the portfolio.
Ishihara Chemicals - $4462.JP - 石原ケミカル株式会社: Developer of plating solutions (machinery, chemicals and processes) for PCBs. Exposed mostly to the smartphone and laptop market, but making inroads in servers. Growth of 7/8% CAGR for the past 8 years, trading at ~10x P/E (peak margins), with a dividend yield of 2% (dividend 3x since 2017), net cash and securities for 45% of market cap, and plans to repurchase shares (10% of sharecount repurchased last year).
Soken Chemical and Engineering - $4972.JP - 綜研化学: Pressure sensitive adhesives used in the digital display industry (LED/LCD/OLED). 15% CAGR since 2017, with significant exposure to China (55% of sales, most manufacturing investment). Margins usually between 5/10% but now closer to 13%. Current P/E 6/7x on peak margins. 40% of market cap is cash. Dividend yield is 4%, no plans to distribute cash.
Keiwa Incorporated - $4251.JP - 恵和株式会社: Also related to display markets, Keiwa manufactures optical films for light diffusion used in LCD displays. Largest market and manufacturing base in China. 6% CAGR since 2018, slump (recovering) since 2022, still with very good margins (15/25%). Trades at a P/E of 7/8x, with a dividend yield of 3%. Cash is ~40% of market cap, with no specific plans for distribution, albeit there have been some buybacks (4.5% of shares in 1Q25).
Natoco Co. - $4627.JP - ナトコ株式会社: More commoditized paint manufacturer, with 5% CAGR past 10 years. Trades at 11x earnings (current margins 5% on 5/10% margin-range), with net cash and securities equivalent to 130% of market cap. Payout ratio is guided for 40% of earnings, with no comments on potential distributions.
I also bought on Yushiro because it screened well but haven’t reviewed the name yet.
Initiate and Increase to non-bank Brazil financials: I have significant Brazilian bank exposure in my Argentinian account (~45% of the account, more below). However, I started adding to some of these names in the IBKR account too.
I initiated a position in Pagseguro (PAGS) (already owned in the Argentinian account), for 2.5% of the portfolio, and also in BB Seguridade (BBSEY), which I didn’t own previously, for about 1% of the portfolio.
I also increased the position in B3 (BOLSY), which is now 2.5% of the portfolio.
I maintained a long-standing position in VINP (Vinci Partners).
I wrote about these Brazilian financials in the Brazilian Capital Markets primer.
Increase JBS: I continued to buy this Brazilian cattle conglomerate, on the expectation of an eventual turnaround of the cattle cycle in North America. It now occupies 3.8% of the portfolio. I wrote about Brazilian meatpackers in the Latam Food Producers Overview from January 2024, and in the Minerva Primer from November 2023. My latest review of JBS is on Seeking Alpha.
Reinitiate BLX: BLX is a Panamanian bank I have been covering for years, which is gaining market share in low risk, very short term credit lines in Latin American foreign trade, mainly trade credit notes and export financing which work as insurance in case the seller/buyer of a foreign trade transaction does not meet his obligations. The main risk with BLX is not credit quality but lower NIMs coming either from higher liquidity (lower rates are a negative in this respect) or from lower demand (lower trade). To counteract these, the name is expanding its lending infrastructure rapidly. I wrote about the bank in 3Q24, and recently on Seeking Alpha. BLX is now 1.25% of the portfolio.
Initiate AVD: American Vanguard Corporation is a producer of pesticides and fertilizers operating mainly in the US. The company has suffered from the double-whammy of a negative agricultural cycle (mainly in cereals) and a negative inventory cycle. This has made gross margins collapse. I initiated a position expecting a cyclical recovery in July 2025. The name is now about 1.8% of the portfolio.
Deep value tech positions
In recent weeks, I have added two positions in tech companies that trade for about net cash on balance sheet, and are either profitable or at least cash flow positive. These companies have been stagnant for a long time, but work as options, in my opinion, because their low market cap vs cash makes any improvement in operations potentially explosive.
Initiate Tuniu (TOUR) is a Chinese tourism package seller, that was obviously hit hard during the pandemic and post-pandemic Chinese environment, but that is growing again, is operationally profitable (although barely above breakeven), and its net cash and securities are more than 100% of market cap. I wrote about the name on Seeking Alpha. My position in TOUR is about 0.85% of the portfolio.
Initiate 1stDIBS.com (DIBS) has a luxury antiques marketplace with about $400 million in GMV annually. I believe such a marketplace can have barriers to entry because it is not easy to coordinate and generate trust in a market where prices are easily in the coupled thousands (5% of items sold on the platform have $100 thousands plus tags). The name has not been growing, and is operationally unprofitable (-30%). The cash gap is filled by SBC to reach approximately breakeven cash. However, the company trades 1.5x times net cash. My position on DIBS is about 1.15% of the portfolio. I wrote about DIBS on Seeking Alpha.
Initiate SMID: Smith-Midland is a manufacturer of concrete infrastructure products (pre-casted calls, anti-sound barriers, concrete guardrails for highways), which has recently started a barrier rental business that is generating much better gross margins. The company has kept OpEx flat so that operating income has grown even more. The name is not cheap (15x NTM earnings in an optimistic view), but the rental business is growing triple digits. I wrote about SMID on Seeking Alpha.
Other maintains: ORBIA, ALPEKA, PINFRA
Aggregate positions and exposures
I maintain a relatively uninvested book, with about 55% gross long (which includes the SPY puts), about 3/4% short and cash for 44%. On a net basis, it is closer to 57% net long and 43% cash. The reason, as commented in previous quarters, is that I haven’t found plenty of convincing things to invest in, or that the names I have (with the exception of the quality names I’m starting to build up, or chemicals which are already big), are not so high conviction.
Argentina account
Q2: 1.9%; YTD: 35.7%; Since inception (Oct20): 233% (CAGR 28%)
As always, I must warn that the returns on my Argentinian account are harder to calculate (my broker in Argentina provides only terrible and broken excel reports in Argentinian pesos, requiring a lot of cleaning and conversions to USD).
Further, the investable universe is much smaller (only Argentinian stocks and a few hundred depositary shares from abroad), and I have an incentive to remain fully invested because of inflation or the risk of holding USD cash in a non US jurisdiction.
Finally, the Argentinian account is now about 40% of the IBKR account, as I don’t add to it, but rather take from it to pay for expenses.
Still, at least for the quarter and the year, given that the positions and weights for the year have been reported for 4 quarters already, and that the account has minimal turnover, they are more easy to confirm.
This quarter there were no significant changes, with most of the gain occurring in Q2 this year with the rally in EEM and Brazilian names. I also did not add to positions.
Reduce EEM: As said in previous quarters ‘EEM is a placeholder position, which I saw as carrying low risk because of its historically depressed prices. I have it until I can something to put the money into.’ This is becoming harder as EEM appreciates, but I really don’t know where else to park the money. At the end of the quarter, EEM represented 49%, after appreciating about 12% on the quarter, but suffering the sales I make to pay for expenses.
Maintain BSBR, LREN3, XP, PAGS: These names did very well in Q2, but not so much in Q3. LREN3 fell 20% in the quarter, probably driven by fears around consumer discretionary income and credit-driven consumption (explored on my latest article on Brazil’s monetary cycle). XP fell 10%. Finally, BSBR is basically flat, and PAGS similarly, up 3.5%. As I had said last quarter, I have become less enamored with BSBR or LREN3 at these prices, but again I don’t know what else to do. I continue to think XP is good value, even at these prices. LREN3 now makes up 20% of the account, XP 12%, PAGS 8.5%, and BSBR 7%.